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S U M M A R Y  A N D  C O N C L U S I O N S
After Asia and Africa had been almost entirely decolonized and dozens of young
states had joined the United Nations Organization, str iking developments have
taken place in international law within the scope of UNO. The young states that
joined UN made other demands upon international larv, a law in the formation of
which they had not participated in any way and in which their interests and views
had not been taken into account.
This thesis represents an attempt at laying down these developments in international
law, at least as far as the legal rules are concerned that respect the maintenance of
international peace and security. This has been done on the basis of an inquiry into
the conflicts with which the UN have been confronted after 1945.
In chapter I the creation of UNO is described. starting with the Covenant of the
League of Nations and ending with the conference of San Francisco, where the
Charter of the UN was drawn up. Besides the fact that the motives and expectations
of the founders of UNO are entered into, this chapter also deals with the principal
articles which have to do with the maintenance of international peace and security.
The starting point of the inquiry is the interpretation which was. in rg45, placed on
various subjects, such as the refraining from the use of force in art. 2, par. 4, the
right of self-defence in art.  5r and further art.39.
The central theme of chapter II is the practice of the Security Council and the
General Assembly. This chapter, in which practically all conflicts submitted to
UNO are dealth with, is divided into three sections: the development of the ban on the
use of force and of the grounds on which a violat ion of this ban may be just i f ied,
secondly the purport of the ban on non-armed intervention and thirdly the relation
between the violations of human rights and in particular of the right of self-determi-
nation of peoples and the maintenance of peace. In addit ion, i t  has been investigated
what the SC and the GA understand by a ' threat to the peace'within the meaning of
art. 39 and what measures, legally binding or not, they have taken, on the ground
of this qualification, for the solution of conflicts and the prevention and termination
of acts of violence. Since, apart from the colonial wars, numerous armed conflicts
are to be attributed to the will of peoples within states to achieve some form of self-
determination, the last chapter deals at great length with the relations between the
principle of self-determination of peoples and the maintenance of peace.
In conclusion, the annex conveys an idea of the value which resolutions may have
for the progressive development of international law.
The inquiry has yielded the following conclusions:
t. The concept of peace was, in 1945, understood negatively as the absence of the
threatening with and the use of armed force between states. There was consequently
aclose relat ion between aÍt.2,par.4, and art.  39. Peace was threatened or violated
by any state which tried to charge existing international relationships by armed
force or by threatening with armed force.
If the SC had arrived at the conclusion that a threat to the peace had arisen, it could
take binding measures directed against the responsible state for the purpose of pre-
venting or terminating acts of violence. The SC acted in the first place as a kincl of
policeman. It was, however, not allowed to use its powers granted by art. 39 for the
solution of conflicts in such a way that it could settle the clashing interests under-
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lying the conflict between the parties. The SC has no legislative powers. Conflicts
had to be reconciled in a peaceful and in particular voluntary way by means of re-
commendations made by the SC. This was. in rg45, provided in chapter VI of the
Charter.
z. Against the background of the horrors of the Second World War the nations
that established UNO wanted an absolute ban on armed force between states to be
included in the Charter. The principal justification for the violation of this ban was
formed by the right of self-defence. Art. 5 r mentions 'an armed attack'. a term
which shows that not every violation of art. 2, par. 4, canjustify a reference to art.
5 r. To the question what is to be understood by an armed attack, however, no an-
swer was given at San Francisco.
3. The sole object of the founders of UNO was not the maintenance of peace ,to
save succeeding generations from the scourge of war'. The Charter recognizes that
the concept of just ice, too, must be shaped and that future changes must be taken
into consideration. Various articles mention the promotion of respect for universal
human rights. the principle of self-determination of peoples - on the purport of
which there was indeed no agreement at all at a time rvhen colonial conditions were
still largely legalized -, the realization of a higher standard of living and full employ-
ment. and the creation of conditions for economic and social progress in the world.
In short, it was realized that peace cannot be maintained without furthering justice.
But the powers put at the disposal of the GA 'as a creative body'to effect just ice al l
over the world were general and non-binding. They are in violent contrast with the
concrete and partly binding powers accorded to the SC 'as an active body' for the
maintenance of peace. The proposal that in art. r, par. r, of the Charter the main-
tenance of just ice be recognized, besides the maintenance of peace and security, as
a primary objective of the UN was not adopted at San Francisco.
4. In practice the SC and GA have seldom declared expressly that art. 2,par. {, had
been violated. Various reasons can be put forward for this. The SC and the GA
are political organs in which political arguments play a preponderant part. The Cold
War, for instance, prevented the SC several times from pronouncing in clear terms
upon evident violations of the ban on the use of force. Te SC and GA were then
compelled to tone down the text of the resolutions, so that they stood a chance of
being passed. And even then the permanent members often made use of their veto
power.
Besides. the declarat ion that art.  2, par.4, has been violated places the SC under the
political and moral obligation to take the consequences of it and to implement sanc-
tions against the guilty state. A neutral wording was then mostly preferred. The
most important reason is, however. that in many cases the SC and the GA could not
agree upon the question who had to be deemed responsible for the violation of the
ban on the use of force and, in connection with this, what excuses within the frame-
work of art. 5 r, dealing with the right of self-defence, had to be recognized.
5. Despite the fact that in practice the ban on the use of force has been applied on a
limited scale and the SC has not always reacted consistently to violations oi this ban,
it is possible to draw certain conclusions from practice and from A/Res/2625
(XXV) as far as the purport of this ban is concerned.
Art. z, par. 4, puts a ban on the threat or use of force between states, armed retalia-
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tory measures in peace time, the military occupation or the annexation of areas, the
threat or use of armed violence as a violation of internationally recognized demar-
cation lines and indirect violence. By indirect violence is understood the organizing
of irregular forces or armed troops, inclusive of mercenary soldiers, in order to in-
vade other countries. Also the organization and/or support of and the participation
in 'acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another state or acquiescing in organized
activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts' is a form
of indirect violence if these acts boil down to the threat or use of force (compare
A/Res/ z6zS (XXY)).
In this connection it should be observed that the SC and GA have deviated from
some of these general rules if states or regimes are concerned which suppress the
right of self-determination of colonial peoples with violent means or which keep
foreign territory occupied (see par. t5 and r6).
6. The ban on the threat of armed force has hardly played a part in practice. In
1945 it had not been foreseen that in the nuclear age the threat with mutual and
total annihilation was to form the basis of the maintenance of world peace and that
in this way the threat of armed violence would be institutionalized in the 'balance of
terror ' .  Although art.2,par.4, only relates to offensive threats between states, i t  is
extremely difficult to draw a clear line between a banned threat and what is deemed
necessary for the security of the state, the preparation for self-defence.
7. The GA and the SC have, in various issues (Namibia and the Middle East in the
first place), not left it open to doubt that military occupation and annexation are
banned. It is less clear whether a state that has military bases abroad is guilty of a
violation of art. 2,par.4, when it refuses to call back its troops after the consent for
the possession of these bases has lapsed.
In practice there is no decisive answer either to the question whether a state, part of
which is occupied or annexed, can refer to art. 5 r for the purpose of reconquering
the occupied territory after a cease-fire or truce has been arrived at. The occupation
and annexation should at any rate not be regarded as 'continuing aggression' in the
sense that at any moment desired a war of self-defence can be started. On the other
hand, however, reasonableness would be outraged if this right was denied after all
efforts at reaching a peaceful settlement had failed for many years and the occupier
made ready to annex the territory. Whether such a right arises will depend on cir-
cumstances.
8. In a large number of resolutions the SC and the GA have condemned indirect
violence, particularly in case states allowed their territory to be used as a base from
which groups made armed attacks on other countries or in case they organized such
groups and provided them with arms. Par. t o in A/ Res/ z6z5 (XXV) presents more
difficulties. The acts decribed there must indeed be so grave and extensive - they
will mostly be performed in conjunction - that they can be put on a par with the
threat or use of force within the meaning of aÍt .2,par.4.I t  is not a simple thing to
establish this, the more so as the acts concerned are partly unlawful as well on the
strength of the ban on intervention and are, moreover, hard to prove.
9. Also armed retaliatory measures which do not aim at war in themselves have
been condemned in numerous resolutions.
275
Various states defended their retal iatory actions by referr ing to art.  5r. Their posi-
t ion was that the extensive and continual inf i l t rat ions from neighbouring countr ies,
which in this way committed indirect violence, consti tuted an armed attack and that
the retal iatory actions served in fact as self-defence to prevent new inf i l trat ions.
The SC, however, has never subscribed to this posit ion, although i t  should be re-
cognized that the dif ference between retal iat ion and self-defence is not quite clear in
the event of indirect violence.
to. With regard to the r ight of self-defence i t  should be stated, in accordance with
Hof fmann,  that  ar t .5r ,  which had been f ixed as narrowly  as poss ib le  in  r945 - 'not
much greater than a needle's eye'- l -ras in practice grown into a ' loophole through
which armies have passed'. The purport and extent of the r ight of self-defence is st i l l
disputed, in part icular i f  anticipatory self-defence is concerned - the dealing of the
first blow if  the opposing party makes ready to attack - and in case of defence
against indirect violence.
The resolut ions of the SC and the GA offer l i t t le hold. And also from the definit ion
of aggression in A/R.es/33r4 (XXIX), in which the most grave acts of violence are
enumerated, i t  cannot be gathered exactly what is to be understood by an armed
attack. Besides the right of self-defence, the states have brought forward numerous
other excuses for the use of armed force: humanitarian intervention, armed inter-
vention for the protection of the nation's own cit izens and armed intervention by
request. Such excuses are ai leged to have been recognized by customary law and not
to have been affected by the Charter. I f  this is indeed true, however, cannot be as-
certained on the ground of the resolut ions passed by the SC and the GA. In some
cases they have tacit ly or expl ici t ly sanctioned them, in other cases they have dis-
approved of them or have kept aloof.
I t  needs not be explained in detai l  that, as a result of the hesitant att i tude of the SC
and the GA towards the r ight of self-defence, humanitarian intervention, armed
intervention for the protection of the nations' own citizens and armed intervention
by request. the ban on the use of force has become a rather hol low provision.
r t .  In al l  cases in which the r ight of humanitarian intervention was referred to,
more or less pol i t ical intentions played a part.  But also armed intervention which
takes place with the most sincere intentions to put a stop to gross and large-scale
violat ions of human rights is by any definit ion of the term an intervention which has
important pol i t ical conseqllences. This need not be the case in the event of armed
intervention to protect the country's own cit izens, where temporary operations
suff ice. Such operations should, however, be l imited to what is necessary under
pressure of circumstances.
rz. Civi l  war comes in principle under the domestic jur isdict ion of the member-
states. UNO cannot intervene unti l  domestic violence threatens to give r ise to an
international confl ict.  This does not mean that the Charter as such turns against the
right of revolut ion and rebel l ion. The exercise of this r ight. however, was impeded
in customary law, because to the government in power the r ight was accorded to
invite third part ies to assist in the suppression of a domestic insurrection. I t  was not
unti l  the rebels had achieved the status of bel l igerency that third part ies were not
al lowed to grant such a request. On the whole, however, this concept of bel l igerency
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and respect for human rights are in the foreground demanding social reforms. It is
an instrument for the maintenance of the status quo.
Yet i t  cannot be derived from UNO practice that intervention by request has no
juridical basis any longer. The SC and the GA have fai led to frame new rules of law
with regard to domestic rebel l ion and the request for intervention or counterinter-
vention. From the fact that there is not any state which has admitted that the request
had been granted to help crush a domestic rebel l ion i t  can only be deduced that
towards intervention by request as such great ret icence is preserved. The states
al leged, however, that their intervention by request had the character of counter-
intervention in a rebel l ion inst igated and supported abroad and that the only object
of the intervention was to neutral ize foreign interference (compare the just i f icat ion
by the Soviet Union of i ts invasion of Afghanistan in December r97i l .The impor-
tant point is then the credibi l i ty of this argument. An actual investigation on the
spot is often indispensible in order to be able to establ ish the nature of the rebel l ion.
For the rest i t  appears from paragraphs r5 and r6 that the SC and the GA have in-
deed laid down rules of law with regard to the colonial war and to the confl icts
arising from the violat ions of human rights in a racial relat ionship.
r3. In practice hardly any connection has been establ ished between the violat ion of
ar t .  z ,par .4 ,  and ar t .39.  In  par .4  i t  has been s ta ted that  the SC and the GA have
declared in a few cases only that the ban on the use of force had been violated. Even
less often did they conclude from it  that a threat to or breach of the peace had arisen.
They have very rarely ordered or recomrnended sanctions to terminate the acts of
violence. The SC and the GA prefer adopting the provisional measures of art.  4o,
which are of a more neutral nature. The establ ishment that a threat to the peace has
arisen is a pol i t ical decision in which such factors as the extent and seriousness of
the acts of violence play a subordinate part.
t4. The ban on intervention comprises - since any armed intervention is banned by
art.  2, Par. 4, of the Charter - al l  forms of non-armed violence directed against the
independence of a state. In resolut ions zr:r (XX) and z6z5 (XXV) intervention is
defined as the use of economic, pol i t ical and other forms of coercion which aim at
the subordination of the exercise of the sovereign r ights of a state and/ or the securing
of advantages of any kind. This ban, which is very broadly outl ined in the resolu-
t ions, needs to be defined more sharply to render i t  practicable, because the applica-
t ion of economic and pol i t ical coercion is a normal phenomenon in international
power pol i t ics.
The practice of the SC and the GA, however, is of l i t t le avai l  in this respect. Al-
though nations accuse each other regularly, few cases of pol i t ical and economic
coercion have t i l l  now been brought before UNO. [t  cannot but be concluded that
the ban only relates to manifest forms of coercion that affect the exist ing order and
are oriented to the authority structure of another nation. The so-called subversive
activi t ies, for instance. come under this ban. But whether and when the application
of economic coercion is banned remains uncertain for the t ime being. Consequently
no connection at al l  has been establ ished between the ban on intervention and art.
39. The chances are that this wi l l  change in the future, when the confl icts between
industr ial ized countr ies and developing countr ies increase and the latter wi l l ,  re-
ferr ing to the ban on intervention, denounce certain forms of economic oppression
in an attempt at reducing their one-sided economic dependence.
1 1 1
15. In 1945 the problems of human rights, as well as colonial relationships were
regarded as issues coming under the domestic jurisdiction of the states. UNO was
not allowed to intervene in a direct and imperative way.
The extent of domestic jur isdict ion in art.  2, paÍ.7, is, however, l iable to develop-
ments in politics and international law. UNO started to concern itself with the viola-
tions of human rights and colonial relationships at the moment when human rights
and the right of colonial peoples to self-determination were formulated in docu-
ments on international law, numerous nations showed their anxiety over the viola-
tions of human rights and forcible denial of the right of self-determination, and
international frictions arose.
The interference on the part of the SC and the GA have mainly been focussed on
colonial and semi-colonial relations and on the violations of human rights in racial
relationships: discrimination and oppression of a black majority by a white minority.
In particular the GA, but the SC too, has established that the internal situation in
the countries of Southern Africa formed at threat to the peace within the meaning of
art. 39. because the violations of human rights in a gross and large-scale manner and
the forcible negation of the right of self-determination have led to an internal racial
war and may result in a bloody international war. It is striking that the responsibility
for the existence of those threats to the peace was not put on those who fought with
force for the recognition of the right of self-determination or on the black neighbour
states that regularly made threats of forcible interference and applied indirect force
by supporting the rebels. Peace was threatened by those states or regimes which
refused to alter a status quo that was deemed intolerable and unjust by the SC and
the GA. The means available to the SC for the maintenance of peace were applied
to promote justice. The SC and the GA came to realize that certain forms of large-
scale and intolerable injustice may lead to armed force and by this endanger the
maintenance of peace. Widening the scope of art. 39, they have applied coercive
measures not only to terminate the conflict between the parties but also to settle the
underlying clashing of interests in favour of one of the parties. This was done
although the drafters of the Charter had based themselves on the fact that conflicts
can only be settled of the parties' own free will and that the primary responsibility
of the SC is to maintain peace and not to maintain just ice.
16. The SC and the GA have gone even further. Taking sides for the first time in an
internal conflict, they have ruled out existing standards of international law and
have drawn up new rules, which are partly reflected in resolution 2625 (XXV) and
in the definit ion of aggression (A/Res/33r+ (XXIX)). They have, for instance, im-
posed on the white governments in Southern Africa the obligation to terminate their
oppression and not to use armed force against the black population. Moreover, they
have denied them the right to refer to art. 5 r by alleging defence of their territory
against indirect violence of neighbour states, as well as the right to arm themselves
and to prepare for an international armed conflict.
On the other hand, the right of self-determination of peoples and their right to fight
for it, even by taking up arms, are recognized. Particularly the GA has, by this
recognition, not only approved of the use of force but has even encouraged it. It
has once again introduced the internal 'just war'. acting itself as author. Besides, it
has, partly together with the SC, imposed on third parties the obligation to refrain
from any form of support to the white minority regimes. It is exactly the rebels who
must, recognized as the 'authentic representatives' of the people, be supported by
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mitted by third parties to help the rebels has never been condemned by the SC and
the GA.
17. I t  should be emphasized that the foregoing only appl ies to colonial peoples and
to peoples oppressed by racist minorities. The SC and the GA have hardly bothered
about the gross and large-scale violations of human rights in a non-racial context
and about the right of self-determination of non-colonial peoples. Only in a few
cases they displayed the insight that a great number of armed confl icts arise from
the violation of human rights and from the disregard of the desire of peoples for
self-determination.
18. Practice has shown that the GA has developed into an organ which acts as a
body that is more or less on equal standing with the SC as far as the maintenance of
peace is concerned and has assumed similar powers, even outside the context of the
'uniting for peace' resolution. In the issues concerning Southern Africa the GA
passed resolutions simultaneously with the SC, which resolutions were often more
far-reaching than thosc of the SC or even ran counter to them. In such cases it was
always the GA which took the init iat ive in developing new legal standpoints which
the SC confirmed some years later, reluctantly and under moral and political
pressure.
The resolutions of the SC in themselves carry more weight, however, from a juridi-
cal as well  as pol i t ical point of view, than those of the GA. Besides the what Róling
calls 'avant garde' role resolutions of the GA can play in the progressive develop-
ment of international law, the resolut ions of this organ are of special importance
when they relate to conflicts in which the great powers are involved and when the
SC is paralysed by their veto.
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